Abstract / This article examines the cultural, economic and political pressures and influences that determined the adoption of the 'European' technical system of digital radio in the UK. Debates over the potential of the new technology to expand both programming content and the range of individuals, companies and organizations with access to radio broadcasting were curtailed in favour of a bureaucratic and technocratic approach to media policy and a desire by the European Commission to establish a new product for the consumer electronics market that would be developed and made in Europe. The article shows that the development of the new system resulted in a 'forced marriage' between the BBC and the commercial sector and that the convergence between DAB and other 'platforms' has profound implications for the relationship between public service broadcaster, government and industry. Furthermore, in order to encourage the larger commercial radio groups to commit themselves to the new technology, they were granted new and unprecedented control over content regulation. This had the effect of further consolidating the hold of dominant interests in the UK radio sector and stifling new initiatives and approaches to the medium. Finally, the article analyses the extent to which DAB digital radio has succeeded in establishing itself in the UK media landscape against strong competition from other, converging technologies.
of an enduring and quite profound relationship between UK citizens and the radio medium. Listening figures, compiled on behalf of the vast majority of radio services in the UK, indicate that radio's appeal is at least as strong as in any period since the arrival of television -indeed overall listening in the middle of the first decade of the 21st century appeared to be higher than when the RAJAR (Radio Joint Audience Research) system was introduced in 1992. There was clear evidence that the internet and other multimedia applications, far from posing a threat to the public's affection for radio, worked with and enhanced the 'radio experience'. The medium's core appeal is due to its ubiquity, mobility, relative cheapness (to produce, transmit and receive) and the many uses and gratifications by audiences (Starkey, 2004: 114) . There is a curious intimacy between station/broadcaster and listener, providing companionship (Hilmes, 1997: 15) that, paradoxically, is often at least partly due to an obvious limitation -that it is a 'blind' medium (Crisell, 1994: 3-14) . So the medium's appeal has remained undiminished, with the average household spending almost as much time listening to the radio as in TV viewing (Ofcom, 2004) .
By October 2005 there were 326 full-time analogue radio stations in the UK; the BBC's UK-wide DAB multiplex carried simulcasts of its five analogue network stations, as well as five digital-only UK-wide services and the BBC World Service, and has reserved capacity on local digital DAB multiplexes for its local radio stations (Ofcom, 2005: 10-12 ). There were 172 commercial stations broadcasting on DAB digital radio; of these around two-thirds were simulcasts of existing analogue local stations broadcasting only in their existing analogue area .
Furthermore, radio became of great interest to the national communications regulator 'because of radio's role as a spear-head, in the move towards convergence' . The regulator's Chief Executive, Stephen Carter, noted though that:
Convergence is becoming a reality; but not in the way the hype-sters of the late 1990s thought. The predicted, single, all-purpose home device or home gateway for computer, telephone, TV and radio may happen at some point. But not for a while yet . . . Content, sometimes re-versioned, is becoming available on a wide range of platforms. However, as this article will argue, the development of DAB digital radio -based on the European Eureka 147 Standard -has been associated with controversy, criticism and questioning from a variety of 'actors' in the broadcasting, political and cultural worlds.
Development of Eureka 147 DAB Radio
The path will be opened up for the European entertainment electronics industry to stimulate a virtually saturated market with new products for car and domestic audio broadcasting units. In turn, this will encourage considerable innovation from European microelectronics manufacturers . . . will therefore provide a long term counterbalance to the increasing dominance of the countries of the Far East in the consumer investment goods industries. (Eureka, 1986) This passage from the original 'project form' for Eureka 147 leaves in no doubt that the driving force for the development of this particular DAB system was to provide a new, distinct industry for the European consumer electronics industry, which had been overshadowed by those in Japan and other 'tiger' economies of the far east. The name 'Eureka 147 ' derives from the prosaic fact that it was the 147th project of the Eureka project (World DAB Forum, n.d.) which was launched by 17 countries and the European Commission in 1985 and had the overall aim of 'Co-ordinating industrial hi-tech R & D (research and development) to increase European industry's global competitiveness' (Eureka, 1999) . Work on a possible digital audio broadcasting (DAB) system began in 1981 at a research institute, the Institut für Rundfunktechnik (World DAB Forum, n.d.).
The original base of the Eureka 147 project and its 'main participant' was a (West) German research institute -the DLR Projekttraeger Informationstechnik (Eureka, 1986) . The project form states: 'In Phase 1, EU 147 was successfully persuaded to agree on one common standardization proposal from the basis of very differing approaches. The staff are highly qualified engineers' (Eureka, 1986) . Both Germany and France contribute 36 per cent to the costs of the project; the UK just 6 per cent (Eureka, 1986) .
The next major step in the project's development -at least from the UK's point of view -was the setting up of the UK DAB Forum, the announcement of which was, significantly, made by the Department of Trade and Industry (which, as its name implies, deals with trade and business issues), rather than the Department of Heritage, which at that time dealt with broadcasting policy. Not surprisingly, it was the industrial and manufacturing aspect which was given emphasis in the stated terms of reference for the new Forum:
The aim is to enhance the potential benefit for UK industry and ensure that British people will be able to enjoy the benefits of DAB, including high quality reception in cars and on portable receivers, and additional services that the new technology will make possible. (DTI, 1993, emphasis added) Of the Forum's 12 founder organizations, only one-third can be considered to be involved in producing or regulating the programmes' output of radio services. One of the first and leading companies to be involved in the Eureka project was Bosch.
In March 1998, just over 11 years after the launch of the Eureka project, the European Commission (EC) organized a conference in Brussels called Radio in the Digital Era, designed to bring together broadcasters, manufacturers and politicians. Bosch's Managing Director, Dr Hamed Amor, revealed the near desperation of this sector of industry and the crucial importance to it of the DAB project as well as the need for political involvement to ensure its success:
After the digitisation of communications, digital radio is probably, beside digital TV, the last chance for Europe to enhance its competitiveness in the consumer electronics industry . . . the European position . . . has to be harmonised; Digital Radio has to be more considered in EU-politics. (European Commission, 1998) Spyros Pappas, then Director General of the EC's DGX, under whose auspices the conference was held, stated that he believed that the Eureka 147 standard could be as fundamental a breakthrough in communications technology as the seemingly ubiquitous mobile phone GSM (wireless communication standard):
This is a European invention, Eureka 147 is a European system which has been recognised as the standard for digital radio broadcasting not only in Europe but also in many countries across the world. The system demonstrates its potential to become a great success like GSM. (European Commission, 1998) The transcript of this conference provides a fascinating insight into the dominant themes in this study -the contrast and tensions between what might be described as:
1. The 'technologists' -those primarily concerned to exploit the potential of broadcast radio to boost industrial production by providing ever renewed and increased markets and patents for receivers, transmitters and so on. 2. The 'broadcast free marketeers', who believe that radio broadcasting should be run predominantly, if not exclusively, by commercial broadcasters and that new technology, especially if it includes the use of 'new' frequencies, should be used as a way of 'liberating' commercial broadcasters from 'excessive' and 'unnecessary' regulation. This approach was well described by Paul Brown, Chief Executive of the UK's Commercial Radio Companies Association (CRCA), who told the conference: 'it will be important to ensure that the regulatory and legislative framework in each country offers an environment that is most conducive to the success of this medium' (European Commission, 1998). 3. The 'liberal pluralists' who believe radio can, and should, be used for benign political and cultural purposes; particularly as a means of underpinning and developing minority cultures. This approach was developed by several speakers at the DGX Conference, including Spyro Pappas, who declared radio was 'very democratic in the sense that it is open to all: to all citizens, to all professionals, to minorities, to organizations, non-governmental ones . . . ' (European Commission, 1998) . The point was also taken up by Professor Enrico Menduni of the University of Rome, who remarked: 'radio as a medium is especially suitable for the promotion (as well as the protection) of cultural diversities, and is likely to foster, in a respectful manner, a process of supranational integration' (European Commission, 1998).
The conference also gave voice to what might be termed the 'Eureka-sceptics': those who are extremely doubtful about the likely success of the Eureka 147 technology in becoming the European, let alone world, standard for radio broadcasting; a sub-group of sceptics believed that the 'window of opportunity' for Eureka may be quickly closing (European Commission, 1998) . The failure of the system would, according to some delegates, be catastrophic not only for the European consumer electronics industry but the EU's goals of greater European political integration. Dr Klaus Schrape perhaps best described this 'nightmare vision' of a failed Eureka 147:
The loss of jobs in particular areas, the loss of image advantages for Europe, the loss of the possibility of having a world standard, the loss of having dynamic development opportunities for radio itself, competitive disadvantage for radio, the loss of the promotion of cultural multiplicity in Europe, and probably the most serious, the loss of European identity. (European Commission, 1998) Dr Schrape's last point -that the European Union is enthusiastic about Eureka because it believes it somehow promotes common cultural and political values and identitiesmay be seen as rather curious, given that the way the frequencies for Eureka were allocated at Wiesbaden in 1995 (BBC R & D, 1995) Enthusiasts for Eureka 147 were perhaps particularly frustrated and disappointed by the USA's refusal to adopt the European standards (often cynically referred to as the 'Not Invented Here Syndrome'), particularly as, in the early 1980s, the Radio Board of the National Association of Broadcasters unanimously voted to accept it as the digital radio standard (McCauley, 2002: 509) . Although radio services have predominantly been at the national and local levels, the inability for receivers using the Eureka 147 system to work in different countries means that the standard will fail to receive the widespread recognition and legitimacy that its AM and FM forerunners achieved. This lack of a common international standard -even within European countries -continued to vex the BBC in 2004. In its contribution to the Department for Culture Media and Sport (DCMS -which had by then taken over responsibility for UK broadcasting policy) the Corporation noted that in some European countries:
regulatory restrictions make it difficult for the public broadcasters to take the lead in investment and thus offer some security for commercial expenditure on digital technology . . . the degree of partnership between public and commercial sectors that exists in the UK is unmatched elsewhere. (BBC, 2004: 25) The report noted that even in Germany -the biggest economy in Europe where, as has been noted, the original technical development for the Eureka 147 system was developed -DAB development was 'becalmed'. It noted that the commercial broadcasters were wary of increasing competition (through the availability of many more channels) and the public broadcasters were split, with the Länder (regional authorities) in the south broadly in favour of DAB, but those in the north ' broadly unconvinced' (BBC, 2004) . The report argued that the situation in France was even more problematic; the public broadcaster was apprehensive about taking the lead because it believed that 'other technologies might supplant it' and, as in Germany, the commercial broadcasters were 'unwilling to face the competition that digital could bring ' (BBC, 2004) .
Throughout all the discussions in the crucial, formative stage of development of DAB in the UK there had never been a meaningful discussion in the public sphere of the most desirable form and configuration of the system. Certainly there is no hint in any government publication that there should -even could -be a debate on the system. Indeed Steve Buckley of the CMA (formerly the Community Radio Association -CRA) is adamant that, by the time the UK DAB Forum was established in the early 1990s, it had already been decided how to adopt and utilize the system:
Members of Parliament were handed regulations and told 'this is the best way to regulate the technical system on offer' but they weren't told the technical system could have been different nor were they told at an early stage there are a couple of different approaches . . . these were not public policy decisions, they were essentially private policy decisions taken by specialised technical servants and the broadcasters and manufacturers. (Steve Buckley) At least the CRA was represented at the beginning of the formal discussions in the UK. Brian West, the then Director of the Association of Independent Radio Contractors (AIRC, RUDIN: THE DEVELOPMENT OF DAB DIGITAL RADIO IN THE UK 167 later to become the Commercial Radio Companies' Association, the CRCA) confirms his organization was invited to join at a slightly later stage, certainly after the BBC. 2 He believes that, whereas national state/public service broadcasters were involved in the initial policy discussions, only when the essentials of the system had been agreed were commercial and local broadcasters invited to participate (Brian West). Crucially, the composition of the UK DAB Forum was dominated by technical and administrative personnel, primarily from the BBC and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI, 1993) . The latter was represented by civil servants, not elected politicians, and, it can be reasonably assumed, had what might be termed a 'techno-centric' view of the issues before them, rather than the content of a public broadcasting system.
From interviews with some of the major participants at these talks and from a study of the minutes and so on of these meetings, one does not gain the impression that there were robust and wide-ranging discussions as to what DAB could do, or what it should be used for; the main focus for attention seems to have been on the subject of how best, technically, to deliver it.
Even though the CMA accepted that, certainly in the early 1990s, Eureka 147 was the only fully tried and tested DAB system (Buckley, 1999: 18-20) , they argued strongly for a different approach to both the technical configuration and the regulatory system.
Instead of one relatively high-powered transmitter -a multiplex -carrying a number of programme services, they wished to see a system of much lower-powered transmitters in any one locality, which they believed would be likely to result in a greater number and greater variety of content and ownership of local services -up to 10 in any area. It is Steve Buckley's belief though that this option was never seriously considered (Buckley, 1999) .
There is some evidence though from memoranda and minutes of the UK DAB Forum that the inherent flexibility of the multiplex arrangement could be used to satisfy at least some temporary services of a community nature. For example, the minutes from the Regulatory Issues Working Group of July 1993 state: (DAB RI, 1993) If the CRA was disappointed, so was the AIRC, who believed they had a 'deal' for a major incentive to commercial analogue broadcasters to take the digital leap. Brian West believed that the civil servants had agreed that current analogue licensees who agreed to invest in digital would have their current licences extended from the normal eight-year period to 15 years -the same period for which they hoped the digital licences would last. A paper from the AIRC to the UK DAB Forum's Regulatory Issues (RI) Group even argued for 20 years, and outlined the main arguments for this:
The radio companies will not commit beyond the length of their broadcasting licences, so either those licences will have to be extended, which is what the AIRC recommends, or the transmission provider will have to take a substantial commercial risk and assume that the broadcasters will get their licences renewed or will be replaced by others who will wish to embrace DAB. (AIRC, 1993) There would seem to be an implied threat here: if major concessions were not made to the UK commercial radio industry, the big players would refuse to invest in it; resulting, so it must be inferred, in the likelihood of an embarrassing flop. However, although the AIRC was disappointed, the agreement for successful bidders for digital multiplex licences to automatically extend their analogue licences for a full renewal period without them having to go through the licence application process, plus the 12-year licence period for digital multiplexes, might seem quite a generous incentive. In addition, there was much better news some six years after the Broadcasting Act, when it was announced that those commercial companies which invested in digital would have their analogue licences rolled forward again, giving them a total of 20 years without threat to their lucrative FM licences.
The Political Economy of DAB
The development of the DAB system in the UK -and the continued and direct involvement of government with public and private broadcasters over development of the system -provides an important example of political economy in British broadcasting (Hendy, 2000: 59) and the ability of the British government to influence governmental decisions abroad. Indeed, the BBC's 2004 submission to the DCMS devotes an entire section to 'the role of government'. After making its case for governmental support for increasing radio spectrum for DAB, the Corporation noted that the UK's then forthcoming presidency of the European Union (July-December 2005):
might offer a platform to explore the issue of radio's digital transition in Europe and, with regular attention thereafter in inter-governmental affairs, DAB digital radio could benefit from heightened momentum at this juncture. (BBC, 2004: 32) Furthermore, noting the Department of Trade and Industry's assistance with the UK delegation to Japan, the submission stated: 'the BBC believes that Government could also bring its influence to bear in industry, capitalizing on its trade links with Japan and other countries with large consumer electronics and automotive interests ' (BBC, 2004) . At home, the report noted enthusiastically that 'DAB digital radio in the UK is a budding British success story and the BBC would recommend that Government investigate ways in which it could assist the expansion of a market that is forecast to be worth £500m in 2008' (BBC, 2004) . The Corporation went further in its apparent interest in the 'emergence of a vibrant audio manufacturing sector in the UK, which could be wellpositioned to take advantage of opportunities as they arise in the rest of Europe; Government may be able to facilitate this' (BBC, 2004) . Indeed, it is striking how much of the Corporation's submission was devoted to the potential for DAB to increase the business opportunities presented by the technology -and how little to the impact of DAB on facilitating the BBC's mission to inform, educate and entertain its licence-fee payers.
The early debates over the programme content of DAB multiplexes appeared to initially encourage the government to legislate in favour of DAB to be a complementary/ additional, rather than a replacement system for analogue broadcasting. The Department of National Heritage (the then responsible Ministry) published its proposals for 'Digital Terrestrial Broadcasting' in August 1995 (Department of National Heritage, 1995 , which were translated in most important respects into the relevant sections of the 1996 RUDIN: THE DEVELOPMENT OF DAB DIGITAL RADIO IN THE UK 169
Broadcasting Act. However, for DAB there was one important change to the plans in the proposals and the eventual Act: Section 3.20 of the proposals said that so far as the award of local digital radio licences are concerned, 'The (Radio) Authority will take into account the mix provided on DAB and the overall mix available from both DAB and analogue broadcasters in the area' (Department of National Heritage, 1995, emphasis added). Yet the Broadcasting Act made no such requirement for the content of the available analogue radio services -only those currently available on digital local or regional multiplexes (Broadcasting Act, 1996) . This is a crucial distinction, because it resulted in each of the first wave of local DAB multiplex operators starting with a 'clean sheet' and able -indeed compelled -to provide (in simulcast or original form) the most popular (and, therefore, with the greatest potential profitability) commercial formats. There was, inevitably, duplication of those formats; whereas the original intention in the 1995 proposals would have resulted in new, different, formats. Brian West confirms that the question of whether DAB should merely replicate -or simulcast -existing analogue services, or be predominantly a new and different set of services, was debated fully in the UK DAB Forum:
I recall this was talked about endlessly! I don't think anyone really had a grip on it because people said it was not going to start unless existing broadcasters were going to go in for it. At the same time people were saying . . . 'but if it doesn't offer something new then are the public going to embrace it?'
Conversely, it also means that as the incremental commercial radio stations -those whose editorial area forms part of that for the larger, earlier (or 'heritage') stations -are offering very similar fare in terms of music to their older, bigger brethren, they will not be able to gain access to a local multiplex to simulcast their analogue (usually FM) transmissions. Clearly, many more frequencies, as well as a change to the legislation, will be needed to allow all such services to migrate to DAB before any analogue switch-off could be implemented.
The terms of the Act, therefore, also made it inevitable that 'community of interest' or 'community of locality' groups would be effectively barred from involvement in the first period of DAB development and virtually ensured that, financial considerations apart, the big commercial players would dominate, if not wholly control, those licences. Simon Cooper of Digital One argued though that it is in the interests of small local/community radio concerns that the big players should dominate DAB in its early stages but this situation will change as the system develops and matures: 
The Real Revolution -Commercial Groups Regulate Their Own Content
The Broadcasting Bill, which was to become the 1996 Broadcasting Act, authorized and set the regulatory parameters and principles for commercial services on DAB. The AIRC/CRCA found themselves to be pleasantly surprised: the Broadcasting Bill handed a large part of the regulation of programme content to the owners of the multiplex licences -the Radio Authority's remit and powers as regulator was to be primarily involved in the owners of the multiplex and the overall 'bouquet' of services, not the individual programme services supplied on them. Tony Stoller, who was then Chief Executive of the Radio Authority, agrees that this changes the regulatory position fundamentally:
At the moment if a programme operator wants to change its output they have to refer to the authority's own regulatory system . . . if a multiplex operator wants to change the programme provider they simply do it . . . the authority can only intervene if it determines that the change will be such as to narrow the range of programmes available but the authority has the burden of proof in demonstrating that. 4
In his keynote speech at that year's Radio Festival, Stoller acknowledged that the government had faced 'challenge and criticism' in this new structure for broadcasting 'based upon multiplex providers . . . From the Radio Authority's point of view, it is the multiplex providers whom we will licence and upon whom most regulation will bite' (RADIO Magazine, 1996a: 16) . The regulator was relieved that, unlike the national analogue commercial stations, the licences would not be offered by competitive tender, but 'a selection process based upon the diversity of services which the provider offers' (RADIO Magazine, 1996a) . Nonetheless, he acknowledged this was a change from the licensing procedures hitherto and one which would 'have profound effects upon the nature of the organization of commercial radio' (RADIO Magazine, 1996a) .
Steve Buckley argues that allowing the commercial multiplex licensees to regulate the individual content of their own services, together with the automatic analogue licence renewals and longer periods of digital licences, amounted to very generous concessions and has resulted in further consolidation of an already rapidly consolidating commercial radio system: The 1996 Broadcasting Act, and the Radio Authority's interpretation of it, has resulted in the geographical and population areas of local digital licences broadly matching the existing coverage areas of analogue commercial broadcasters. The effect of this is to greatly restrict the flexibility of the system -at the local level DAB is no more efficient in the use of frequency spectrum than analogue.
RUDIN: THE DEVELOPMENT OF DAB DIGITAL RADIO IN THE UK
A unique feature of the transmission arrangements of DAB in the UK is that BBC local/regional analogue service(s) have a 'must carry' requirement on commercial multiplexes but there is no automatic right for local/regional analogue commercial stations; nor is there any limit to the number of services also broadcast on analogue. Indeed, the Radio Authority's appraisal of the first London licence -also the first contested multiplex -was awarded to CE Digital, which offered fewer new/digital-only services than its two rivals. This would seem to indicate a preference for the simulcasting of as many existing, established commercial local services as possible; the justification of this being the Authority's interpretation of the intentions of Parliament when it framed the Broadcasting Act (Radio Authority, 1999) .
Technical Quality and Programme Choice
The BBC initially promoted its DAB service primarily on the improvement in sound quality and multimedia capabilities, with the range of new services coming well down the list. At the September 1995 launch, Liz Forgan, then Managing Director, BBC Network Radio, called it a 'historic moment' (Street, 2002: 131) :
the dawn of a third age of radio -the technological progression from AM, which is now 100 years old, and FM, now 50 years old, into the digital multi-media world of the 21st century. Consumers will get superb quality sound, a fade-free signal and a whole range of new services on
simple, easy to use sets. (Street, 2002) Admittedly, at this stage the BBC was only simulcasting its analogue networks but, nevertheless, the emphasis on sound quality over programme number and range stuck and, it can be argued, dogged the perception and take-up of DAB for many years.
A few months later, the 1996 Sound Broadcast Equipment Show (SBES) in Birmingham was hosting what the RADIO Magazine (1996b) said was 'believed to be the world's first in DAB demonstrations', affording delegates the opportunity to 'hear for themselves the subjective audio quality of AM, FM and DAB coded at a variety of bit-rates in real broadcast situations' (RADIO Magazine, 1996b) . Formats such as classical music, jazz, rock, dance, adult contemporary and speech were all demonstrated (RADIO Magazine, 1996b) . Mike Thorne, NTL's Radio Business Manager, acknowledged in the article the dilemma which DAB posed for broadcasters -the compromise between quality and quantity of services on a multiplex: a dilemma which continues to cause anguish amongst broadcasters:
DAB offers growth for everyone in the radio industry, but only if its possibilities are fully understood and explained . . . clearly the economics of DAB are closely tied up with how many services you can squeeze into a multiplex. (RADIO magazine, 1996b) By 2004 though, the Corporation had accepted that the improved sound quality was far less important than the increase in programme choice. Citing research carried out by market research group Claritas on behalf of the trade body the Digital Radio Development Bureau, the Corporation noted that extension of listening choice 'is fundamental to driving take-up of DAB, with wider choice consistently cited by digital radio owners as the main reason for buying sets' (BBC, 2004: 14) . Furthermore, the BBC claimed to 172 CONVERGENCE VOL. 12 NO. 2 have devised its portfolio of new digital radio services: 'to widen the choice for our existing listeners and, more importantly, to improve our offering to audiences with which BBC Radio has historically underperformed: people under 45 years of age and ethnic minorities ' (BBC, 2004) . However, although one may take the BBC's stated wishes at face value, the reality of the audience is rather different. In the same report the Corporation acknowledged that BBC 7 -the schedules for which are dominated by archive recordings of the Corporation's drama and comedy -'has been cited consistently as the station providing the main reason for set purchase . . . The 45 to 54 year old age group is the largest among current purchasers, although the 55 to 64 year old age group is close behind' (BBC, 2004: 23) . The unique regulatory environment for commercial services has mitigated even further against audiences that traditionally the commercial sector has found hardest to reach -ethnic minorities (again) but, for this sector, also the older (45+) audience. Only in London, which has three multiplexes, has the range of radio services for minority perspectives been achieved, with stations catering for a 'gay' audience and those concerned with environmental issues. However, in November 2005 the UK's first permanent Islamic radio station began broadcasting in Bradford -an industrial city in the north of England, which has a high Muslim population (Islamonline, 2005) .
The initial legislation that allowed the commercial sector to enter the DAB systemand the terms on which it could do so -continued to irk some in the commercial radio industry. John Aumonier, former Chief Executive of Radio First, was quoted in the RADIO Magazine (2003: 4) as blaming legislation introduced by the Conservative government to allow the industry to become its own 'gatekeepers':
All the research we ever did at Radio First, years ago, proved that content, as usual, is king. Where the problems lie are with control and regulation. DAB would have taken off and would have moved even faster, were it not for the fact that the legislation enabled the existing large radio groups to become the 'gatekeepers'. It seems these gatekeepers have cared more about automatically doubling the duration of their analogue licences and ensuring the cost of their multiplexes is next to zero, than they have about the quality of the new offerings to the listener. (RADIO Magazine, 2003) He criticized the Radio Authority for having 'wrung its hands' and of 'impotence' and failure to ensure fair competition:
Maybe it's not their fault but the fault of legislation. If the big groups 'allowed' more appealing services onto the multiplexes, indeed ones that, shock, horror, may even compete with their own services, then the slow take up of DAB would be solved overnight. (RADIO Magazine, 2003) The contrast in enthusiasm between small and large commercial radio companies for DAB was a feature from the time that it was being fully tested and promoted as a serious new technology which the industry had to come to terms with. The response to a £2 million advertising campaign by Digital One and the Radio Advertising Bureau in the summer of 2000 drew a mixed response. According to the RADIO Magazine (2000: 36) one station MD said: 'the campaign is another example of industry bodies being hi-jacked by the larger groups to the detriment of the smaller independent players'.
DAB and Convergence
As a medium, radio is of special interest to Ofcom, (Ofcom, 2004) This extract from a speech Stephen Carter, Chief Executive of the UK's communications regulator Ofcom made in September 2004 illustrates the UK phenomenon of multiplatform listening to digital 'radio' -which, where the platform is primarily that for 'TV', raises questions about when 'radio' ceases to be defined by the physical embodiment of a radio receiver -and the implications of this for both the industry and audiences.
The BBC saw the delivery of its digital radio services on Freeview -the national, terrestrial free-to-air digital TV system -as a positive example of the main advantages related to increased interactivity. As Jenny Abramsky, the BBC's then Director of Radio and Music put it in a speech to the National Association (BBC, 2003b) Figures from the official audience measurement service RAJAR indicate that although these different platforms for the delivery of 'radio' content are important, it is the sale of DAB receivers that is mostly responsible for the increase in listening to a digital platform. The figures showed that among those with access to digital radio over any platform, 10.5 per cent of all listening in August and September 2005 was via digital platforms, with DAB accounting for 5.5 per cent of total radio listening during that same period -up from 2.4 per cent in the same period the previous year (Timms, 2005) . Sally de la Bedoyere, the Managing Director of RAJAR, was quoted as saying the new figures demonstrated a 'major shift from analogue to digital receivers', with RAJAR data also showing that home ownership of DAB sets rose from 4.5 per cent in September 2004 to 10.5 per cent in September 2005 (Timms, 2005) . These figures, as interpreted by the Digital Radio Listening Bureau (DRDB, 2005a) , showed that in November 2005 radio listening via digital radio per se compared with the previous year had grown by more than 165 per cent, compared with Digital Television (42%) and the internet (84%). DAB also recorded the largest increase in reach (95%), when compared to that of DTV (28%) and internet listening (30%).
The development of digital multimedia broadcasting (DMB) -which can work equally well for audio, video and text (BBC, 2004: 47) (DRDB, 2005b) However, due to different encoding technology, this is not compatible with existing DAB receivers and the DRDB notes that if this system were to take off 'the BBC would have to consider its possible impact on DAB and its potential role in service provision' (DRDB, 2005b) .
For commercial radio, the fast-developing DAB technology means opportunities to gain revenues other than from straightforward broadcast advertising and sponsorship. Mathew Horsman, Director of London consultancy Mediatique, told the BBC's In Business programme, in an edition devoted to digital radio:
You could envisage a world where, because digital has so much more capacity, you can offer not just voice and music and interviews such as this but you can also offer services like traffic reports on demand or the ability to buy a cinema ticket through the radio . . . digital radio has the ability to transmit text and data which people may well in the end pay for. (BBC, 2003a) Meanwhile, the commercial exploitation of radio and TV services to mobile (cell) phones was stepped up in the summer of 2005 with a joint project between a number of broadcasters -including GCap Media, Digital One and BT Livetime with Virgin Mobile customers, which enabled more than 50 digital radio channels and the UK's first Electronic Programme Guide (EPG) to a mobile device using DAB technology (GCap Media, 2005) . Perhaps even more significantly from a commercial point of view, the digital radio group UBC announced in November 2005 that it was launching a device that will allow users to download radio tracks to their mobile phones as they are played live (Evening Standard, 28 November 2005) . UBC estimated the market for this will be worth £14 million in four years.
A major development -which promises to revolutionize the audience's relationship with the medium, is the ability of listeners to 'time-shift' listening, to construct their own schedules and speedily download whole programmes or edited highlights, for later listening on portable devices -the so-called 'Podcasting'. The rapid take-up of wireless broadband services meant that this phenomenon was now increasingly available via mobile connections. As Jenny Abramsky's 2003 speech to the NAB pointed out though, it is not just the internet that provides the means for this 'listening on demand'. DAB digital radios which had pause, record and rewind facilities built in to the receivers were becoming established, and the hard-disc recorders which had primarily been designed and marketed for the recording and storing of TV programmes could equally be used for radio services. In general, convergence was increasing the ability of the BBC to connect to its audiences:
sometimes it can be all too easy to forget about your audience when you are wrapped up in making programmes for them -digital technology of this kind brings you closer to them. (BBC, 2003b) Even though Abramsky conceded that the implications of all of this for the traditional broadcaster and linear programme scheduling could be 'scary', she argued that the more traditional models of radio production and reception would continue to dominate for some years:
This art will not die -I firmly believe that live, linear radio will retain a dominant place in the digital future. But audiences are going to expect greater choice, flexibility and control in their media consumption and radio must embrace that. If we do, we believe we will grow the market and take greater share of media consumption at those times of day when other media traditionally dominate. (BBC, 2003b) It is clear from this that Abramsky believes that the combination of DAB and converging technologies will not only help retain radio audiences but will increase listening at the expense of TV.
Conclusion
Unravelling and analysing the background to the introduction and early development of DAB digital radio in the UK highlights a number of pertinent factors in the formation of policy in the new, rapidly converging, media landscape. This article has argued that the interests of the commercial radio sector and its successful lobbying of government, along with the long-standing influence of the BBC in governmental thinking and the desire by the political elites in Europe to develop a new market for manufacturing in the domestic electronic sector, merged to produce a technological and regulatory system that satisfied these powerful interests. Mutual interests produced some unusual alliances and not just of a policy nature -the chip used in the EVOKE, as well as some of the other receivers, was developed partly with finance supplied by the largest UK radio group, GWR (now GCap).
The development of DAB is unusual in another important respect, namely, the cooperation between the commercial and BBC sectors. The launch of the Digital Radio Development Bureau (DRDB) and co-ordinated campaigns on commercial and BBC stations has been a unique example of the two sectors working together for their mutual benefit. Both have invested considerable sums of money in the technology and formats and so would have a great deal to lose if it were ultimately to fail.
The development of DAB and the convergence with both 'old' and 'new' media also introduces a more fundamental conceptual argument about what radio actually is and how the technology can or should affect that concept. The ability of DAB to transmit text graphics and even video/moving pictures, and in devices such as mobile phones, has made some industry figures (as outlined earlier) worry that DAB will be seen as poor man's television rather than 'rich', enhanced, radio.
This article has examined the key influences on the development of DAB in the UK. It seems clear from the evidence presented here that listeners' needs have been bottom of the list of concerns and that the promotion of radio as a public good has been far less important in the development of DAB than interests of political economy. Ultimately, however, it may well be listeners who determine the success or otherwise of the intended technologically informed outcomes. 
Notes

